Telephone Consumer Protection Act

Jones, et al. v. Blackstone Medical Services, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-01074-JEH-RLH, 2025 WL 2024764 (C.D. Ill. July 21, 2025)

On June 20, 2025, the United States Supreme Court released McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., providing that:

In an enforcement proceeding, a district court must independently determine for itself whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct. District Courts are not bound by the agency’s interpretation, but instead must determine the meaning of the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.

McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs. V. McKesson Corp., 14 S. Ct. 2006, 2015 (2025).

On July 21, 2025, heeding the Court’s advice, and applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, the Central District of Illinois concluded that Regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) do not apply to text messages.

• Factual Background.

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit, alleging Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) and its implementing Regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) (Do-Not-Call Registry) and (d) (Internal Do-Not-Call List) when it sent Plaintiffs text messages.

Defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that 47 U.S.C. 227(c) does not prohibit text messages.

• Legislative and Regulatory Background.

Through Section 227(c) of the TCPA, Congress directed the FCC to initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations. Pursuant to this authority, the FCC established a National Do-Not-Call Registry (47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)) and a requirement that procedures be maintained for internal Do-Not-Call Lists (47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)).

• The Court’s Ruling.

Important to the Court was the fact that Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA provides a private right of action “by ‘A person who has received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under 227(c) . . .’” (emphasis in the original). The Court also noted that Section 227(c) explicitly refers only to a “telephone call,” and “only ‘call,’ ‘telephone call,’ and ‘artificial or prerecorded voice telephone call’ appear in Section 227(c) and its implementing regulations.”

Applying the principle of statutory interpretation requiring that words take their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning (unless otherwise defined), the Court pointed out that text message technology was not available when the TCPA was enacted in 1991. Thus, the term “telephone call” could not have included text messages or SMS messages and, under a plain reading of the TCPA, Section 227(c)(5) does not regulate text messages.

The Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the FCC’s 2003 Order brought text messages within the purview of Section 227(c)(5), concluding that the 2003 Order only addressed text messages sent using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message, and, thus, the 2003 Order “does not even address the specific provision of the TCPA and its regulations at issue in this case.” Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument that later FCC Orders established that text messages are subject to Section 227(c) was “problematic,” because those Orders referred back to the 2003 Order, which explicitly only referenced Section 227(b) and themselves failed cite to Section 227(c).

Finally, the Court concluded that while 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) purports to apply Sections 64.1200(c) and (d) to text messages, the Regulation incorporates the 2003 Order by providing that Section 64.1200(c) and (d) apply to “text messages to wireless telephone numbers to the extent described in the Commission’s Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-287, FCC 03-153,” adding that by limiting Section 64.1200(e)’s application in such a manner, the FCC presented a “complicated rather than simplified interpretation of ‘telephone call’ for purposes of Section 227(c)(5).”

For these reasons, the Court held that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of Section 227(c) of the TCPA and its implementing regulations.

A copy of the Court’s opinion can be found by clicking here.