Telephone Consumer Protection Act

Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026)

Guided by the plain language of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that that text messages “do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5),” affirming the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ consolidate class action.

Case Background

After allegedly receiving numerous marketing text messages from Defendant, multiple Plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action lawsuit, alleging violations of the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act, § 501.059(5) (“FTSA”) and the Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA. Defendant moved to dismiss the TCPA claim, arguing that Section 227(c)(5) does not create a private right of action for text messages. The district court agreed, holding that the crux of the complaint involved receipt of text messages, and dismissed the case after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the FTSA claim. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court’s Analysis.

Because the appeal turned on the single issue of whether text messages are telephone calls within the meaning of Section 227(c)(5), the Court began its analysis with the statute’s plain text, which provides a private right of action for an individual “who has received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection[,]” interpreting the language “in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.” The Court next noted that the phrase “telephone call” could not have included text messages when it was enacted in 1991, because the first text message was not sent until the following year.

Defendant’s Argument

Based on this undisputed fact, Defendant argued that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “telephone call” cannot encompass text messages. Considering Defendant’s argument, the Court did note that while every statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment, new applications may arise in light of changes in the world. For example, the term “money” must always mean a medium of exchange but what qualifies as a medium of exchange may depend on the facts of the day, i.e., money can include an electronic transfer of a paycheck.

Next noting that the TCPA does not define the phrase “telephone call,” the Court turned to contemporaneous dictionary definitions when the TCPA was enacted, noting that then a telephone was “‘[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance[.]’ And a call meant ‘to get or try to get into communication by telephone.’ Thus, in 1991, a ‘telephone call’ referred to communication via sound.” Important to the Court was the fact that “[t]ext messages do not reproduce sounds, suggesting that they do not qualify as a new application of telephone call within the meaning of that term.”  

Plaintiffs’ Arguments

Plaintiffs argued for a broader interpretation of the phrase “telephone call” as encompassing communications by telephone. Otherwise, they argued, the TCPA’s protections would become increasingly ineffectual as new technologies emerge. Cognizant that “[t]oo much ‘liberality’ will undermine the statute as surely as too literal an interpretation would,” the Court rejected “the march of technology” argument, standing alone, as sufficient to identify the meaning of statutory language.  

The Court also found compelling analysis of provisions surrounding Section 227(c)(5). For example Sections 227(c)(1) and (c)(2) direct the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to engage in rulemaking to “’to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object,’” and “Sections 227(c)(3) and (c)(4) discuss the creation of a national database of individuals ‘who object to receiving telephone solicitations,’ i.e., the creation of the National Do-Not-Call Registry,” concluding that:

these other subsections of § 227(c) consistently use the term “telephone solicitation,” which the TCPA defines as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person[.]” Yet § 227(c)(5) only creates a private right of action for the receipt of more than one “telephone call” within a 12-month period. It doesn’t mention telephone messages, nor does it use the more encompassing term, telephone solicitation [. . .] we read the words of a statute in their context, which includes the overall statutory scheme. And we presume that because Congress used a different term in these two subsections of § 227, it intended a different meaning. The best reading of § 227(c)(5) is therefore that it provides a narrower remedy than recovery for all forms of telephone solicitation; plaintiffs may sue after receiving unwanted telephone calls, but not unwanted telephone solicitations (which include not merely calls but also messages). Because § 227’s definition of telephone solicitation distinguishes between calls and messages, the two must refer to different forms of communication by telephone.

Plaintiffs advanced two additional arguments for why text messages support a National Do-Not-Call Registry (“DNCR”) claim, first arguing that decisions by the United States Supreme Court and other circuits support their reading of the statue. They pointed to Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, which addressed a different provision of the TCPA, as stating that ““[a] text message to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed, qualifies as a ‘call’ within the compass of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).” But as the Court recognized, the Supreme Court subsequently indicated in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, that this was not a substantive decision on the meaning of “call,” just an assumption for purposes of the case since neither party contested it. But in this case, the Parties did contest the issue. The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ reliance on other circuit court cases because they dealt with other provisions of the TCPA, and were decided before Duguid.

Alternatively, among other arguments, Plaintiffs asserted that the FCC’s interpretation of Section 227(c) supports their view, pointing in part to the FCC’s decision to extend DNCR protections to text messages. Rejecting this argument the Court first noted that the DNCR was implemented pursuant to Section 227(c)(3), “which refers to ‘telephone solicitations,’ so the FCC’s interpretation doesn’t inform our understanding of § 227(c)(5), which refers only to telephone calls.” Moreover, the Court added that even if the FCC’s interpretation supported Plaintiffs’ argument, “we aren’t bound by the FCC’s interpretation,” citing McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., and noting that therein the Supreme Court instructed the Court to “‘interpret the statute as courts traditionally do under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.’”

The Court’s Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision concluded, noting that “Congress’s general concern about intrusive telemarketing practices doesn’t necessarily mean that it adopted a broad definition of telephone call. In fact, Congress specifically found that telemarketing calls create a public safety risk when they seize telephone lines needed for emergency or medical assistance. Spam text messages don’t pose this risk, making it unsurprising, or at the very least reasonable, that § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action would cover telephone calls but not messages. Repeated, unwanted text messages are undoubtedly a nuisance. But they do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5).” A copy of the Courts’ opinion can be found by clicking here.